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Abstract
In this paper we formalize the uncertainty about the persistence of cost-push shocks using
an open economy optimal control model with Markov regime-switching and robust control.
The latter is used in only one of the regimes producing relatively more persistent cost-push
shocks in that regime. Conditional on being in the regime with relatively less persistence, we
obtain two main results: a) underestimating the probability of switching to the regime with
relatively more persistent cost-push shocks causes higher welfare losses than its overestima-
tion; and b) the welfare losses associated with either underestimation or overestimation of
such probability increase with the size of the penalty on inﬂation deviations from its target.
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Resumen
En este documento formalizamos la incertidumbre de la persistencia de choques cost-
push al usar un modelo de control ´ optimo para una econom´ ıa abierta con transiciones de
Markov y control robusto. Este ´ ultimo es usado ´ unicamente en uno de los reg´ ımenes para
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1. Introduction 
One of the main concerns of monetary policy is the uncertainty about the persistence of cost-push 
shocks. For instance, in 2004 a surge in the global demand of commodities (or primary goods) 
increased their international price, prompting a cautious behavior of many central banks in the face 
of inflationary pressures throughout the year. Figure 1 shows the increase in commodity prices 
during 2004. In the Mexican case, the cautious approach to price shocks by the monetary authority 
was due to several factors. First, the direct impact of higher commodity prices on inflation. Second, 
the uncertainty about the evolution of commodity prices in the future. Third, the possibility of 
second round effects of the aforementioned shocks on the process of price formation. Finally, the 
possibility of undesirable effects on inflation derived from the combination of continuing increases 
in commodity prices and the recovery experienced by the global economy.
1 






















































































































Figure 1. World Commodity Prices 2000-2004 
                                                      
1
   The possibility of persistent effects of the shocks observed in 2004 was highlighted in the Summary of 
the Quarterly Inflation Report October-December 2004 published by Banco de México in January 2005.   2
In this paper, we develop a formal framework to obtain the optimal policy of an inflation-
targeting monetary authority in the presence of uncertainty about the persistence of cost-push 
shocks.
2 We allow the economy to randomly alternate between two regimes that only differ in the 
degree of persistence of cost-push shocks. The possibility of sudden changes in the persistence of 
cost-push shocks is given by introducing robust control in only one of the regimes of the Markov 
chain process. Following Hansen and Sargent (2003), robust control in one regime is specified by 
introducing a set of additive distortions to the cost-push process which generates more persistent 
shocks than the non-robust regime. This combination of Markov regime-switching and robust 
control is applied to an open economy model for the Mexican economy. We obtain the welfare 
losses conditional on being in the regime with relatively less persistent shocks. In the evaluation of 
the monetary policy rule, we compare recklessness and caution losses. Recklessness losses occur 
when the monetary authority underestimates the probability of switching to the regime with 
relatively more persistent shocks. On the other hand, cautionary losses take place when the 
monetary authority overestimates the aforementioned probability. 
Our investigation suggests that monetary authorities in this environment should err on the 
side of caution. We find that a cautious monetary authority delivers lower welfare losses than a 
reckless one when it is possible to switch to the regime with relatively more persistent cost-push 
shocks. Moreover, we show that both recklessness and caution losses increase with the penalty on 
inflation deviations from its target.  
Previous literature on robust control finds that optimal monetary policy generally 
commands a stronger response of the interest rate to fluctuations in target variables, such as 
inflation and the output gap when comparing to the case of no uncertainty. In particular, Becker et 
al. (1994) produce an algorithm for robust optimal decisions with stochastic nonlinear models 
                                                      
2   For this paper purposes, the underlying factors affecting this type of uncertainty are indistinguishable.   3
applied to the United Kingdom. Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001a) explore two types of 
Knightian model uncertainty to explain the difference between estimated interest rate rules and 
optimal feedback descriptions of monetary policy.
3 Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001b) deal with 
robust control by using three different ways of modeling misspecification in order to explain the 
inflationary phenomena of the 1970s in the United States. Rustem et al. (2001) compare policy 
recommendations for worst-case scenarios with those of the robust control approach in inflation 
targeting regimes. Stock (1999), Onatski and Stock (2002), and Giannoni (2002) study a type of 
uncertainty reflected on the values of coefficients of the linear equations of a structural model. 
Walsh (2004) concludes that the problems arising from unexpected shocks become more serious if 
the shocks last longer. Consequently, central bankers who desire a robust policy will react to all 
inflation shocks as if they were going to be more persistent. Markov chain processes in optimal 
control problems have been the subject of recent interest. Zampolli (2006) combines optimal control 
and Markov regime-switching and finds more cautious optimal monetary policies in the presence of 
abrupt changes in one multiplicative parameter. Blake and Zampolli (2004) extend those results to 
find the optimal time-consistent monetary policy for models with forward-looking variables. 
To the authors´ knowledge, there have not been previous studies combining Markov 
regime-switching and robust control to obtain the optimal policy in the presence of uncertainty 
about the persistence of cost-push shocks. Conditional on being in the regime with relatively less 
persistence, we find two main results: 1) underestimating the probability of switching to the regime 
with relatively more persistent cost-push shocks causes higher welfare losses than its 
overestimation; and 2) the losses associated with the underestimation and overestimation of such 
probability increase with the penalty on inflation deviations from its target. These results argue in 
                                                      
3   These authors talk about the notion of Knightian uncertainty when the best guess of the true model is 
flawed in a serious but unspecificable way.    4
favor of caution over recklessness when it is possible to switch to the regime with relatively more 
persistent cost-push shocks.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the optimal 
control problem with unstructured regime shifts. Section 3 shows the procedure to compute the 
optimal solution to the problem with Markov regime-switching and robust control. Section 4 
presents the open economy model for the Mexican economy. Section 5 describes the procedure to 
find a reasonable level of robustness. In Section 6, we obtain the recklessness and caution losses for 
different preference parameters of the monetary authority. Finally, Section 7 presents our 
conclusions. 
2. Optimal control problem with unstructured regime shifts 
In this model, the policy maker is a monetary authority with inflation targeting. Moreover, at any 
given point the economy can alternate between two regimes. The probability of shifting regimes is 
given by a first order Markov chain process. In regime 1 the policy maker is uncertain about her 
cost-push process and cannot assign probabilities to alternative sets of cost-push specifications. In 
order to deal with Knightian model uncertainty, the policy maker uses robust control and introduces 
an autocorrelated distortion in the cost-push process in the form of a new control variable,  1 t ω + . 
The value of  1 t ω +  depends on the next period regime, and ultimately on the history of state 
variables.
4 This produces a key difference between the two regimes: cost-push shocks are more 
persistent in regime 1 than in regime 2. However, the distortion needs to be bounded or it will 
produce infinite damage to the policy maker. The bound on  1 t ω +  is chosen outside the model and it 
is inversely associated with the “free” parameter of robust control, θ . An increase in θ  decreases 
                                                      
4
   Since the distortion  1 t ω +  is turned off in regime 2, the cost-push process does not become relatively 
more persistent in such regime –i.e. there is no Knightian model uncertainty in regime 2.    5
the degree of the Knightian model uncertainty and the persistence of the cost-push shock in regime 
1. When θ →∞ the Knightian model uncertainty disappears and the cost-push shocks persistence 
is the same in both regimes. Moreover, given that in regime 1 the policy maker faces Knightian 
model uncertainty, the regime shift is unstructured – i.e. there is no change in a particular parameter 
when there is regime-switching.  
The policy maker’s problem is an infinite horizon Quadratic Linear Problem (QLP) that 
consists of choosing the nominal interest rate to minimize the nominal interest rate variability and 
the deviations of the inflation and output gap variables from their respective targets. The quadratic 
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Moreover, the policy maker introduces a fictitious “evil” agent who tries to maximize such 
deviations in regime 1 by making the cost-push process relatively more persistent. In addition, the 
policy maker faces a set of constraints and regime switching. The unstructured regime shifts are 
derived from changing the value of the robust control “free” parameter. Formally, the robust control 
problem consists of choosing 
*
it u  to extremize the quadratic criterion function.
5 Since the Riccati 
equations for the QLP result from first-order conditions, and the first-order conditions for 
extremizing a quadratic criterion function match those of an ordinary (non-robust) QLP with two 
controls (see Hansen and Sargent, 2003, pp. 29-30), the optimal control problem with unstructured 
regime shifts can be written as follows: 
( )   ~ ~ ~ max min 1
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5
   Extremization refers to minimizing the criterion function with respect to the original control variables 
and maximizing it with respect to  1 k ω +  which is a function of the next period’s regime.   6
subject to the system equations
6 
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where  1t x  is n1 x 1 vector of predetermined state variables for period t; β  is the discount factor (0 
< β  ≤  1);  it V  is the value function in the current regime i for period t. The new control 
*
it u  is a 
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where  1)  x  (n     1 1 it ω +  is a (n1 x 1) vector of model distortions for period t that depend on the next 
period’s regime. In addition the new matrices in the objective function and in the system of 
equations are given by the following equations: 
it 22 it 21 it it 12 11 it D Q ' D     Q ' D     D Q   Q   Q + + + = ~
                          (5) 
it 1 2 it it 22 it it it G ' U     U G     G Q ' G     R   R + + + = ~
                           (6) 
2 it 1 it 22 it it 12 it U ' D     U     G Q ' D     G Q   U + + + = ~
                           (7) 
jt 12 11 jt D  A    A   A + = ~
                                 (8) 
jt 12 1 jt G  A   B     B + = ~
                                 (9) 
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6
   Some of the auxiliary matrices are defined in Appendix A.   7
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where  {} 1 | 2 Pr 1 = = = + t t r r p  and  { } 2 | 1 Pr 1 = = = + t t r r q  ∀t =1,2,3… 
Thus, p is the probability that the economy alternates from the relatively more persistent to 
the relatively less persistent cost-push shock process and q represents exactly the opposite type of 
probability. These probabilities represent the uncertainty about the type of regime in the next 
period. We assume that the regime of the economy  1 + t r  is revealed only at the end of period t, after 
the policy action has been decided. That is, when the policy maker chooses the policy rule,  t r  is 
known but  1 + t r  is still uncertain. 
3. Optimal solution with unstructured regime shifts  
Solving the optimal control problem with unstructured regime shifts is equivalent to finding a 
contingent policy rule 
*
it u . By adapting the Giordani and Söderlind’s (2004) discretion solution to 
the presence of Markov regime-switching given by Equations (2)-(4) and (10), we obtain the 
following solution:  
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combining Equations (11)-(13) with Equation (3), we obtain 
1t it 2t x K x = , with   it it it it F G D K ~ − =                                                                                            (14) 
Hence, the value functions for regime 1 and 2 are given by Equations (15) and (16), 
respectively: 
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=+
+− +
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          (16) 
The solution to the algorithm to Equations (11)-(16) is shown in Appendix A. Such solution 
incorporate the standard solutions when we set   0 pq = = . In this special case, we would obtain 
the solution to two optimal control problems, one corresponding to regime 1 and the other to regime 
2 under the assumption that each regime will be there permanently.   
4. Unstructured regime shifts in an open economy model 
We used the open economy model for the Mexican economy in Roldán-Peña (2005). This model 
takes into account the dynamic homogeneity property as well as some parameters restrictions which 
reflect some assumptions about long-term values for the real interest rate and the real exchange 
rate.
7 The endogenous variables are the output gap ( t x ), core inflation (
c
t π ), and the real exchange 
rate ( t tcr ). Headline inflation and the change in the nominal exchange rate are denoted by  t π  and 
t tcn ∆ , respectively. The equations for the endogenous variables, headline inflation and the 
purchasing power parity are shown below. The superscript “US” in a variable denotes its value for 
the United States which is considered exogenous. 
                                                      
7   For estimation methods and samples used see Roldán-Peña (2005).    9
  {} t t
US
t t t t t t u gto b x b r b x E b x b b x + ∆ + + + + + = − − − + − 2 6 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0                                                  (17) 
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t c t w w π π π + =                               (20) 
t t
US
t t tcr tcn π π + ∆ = + ∆                                                                                                                 (21) 
where  t g , t u  and  t v  represent the error terms of the core inflation, output gap and real exchange 
rate specifications, respectively. 
8 They are defined as autoregressive AR(1) processes as follows: 
t t g t g g g ˆ 1 + = − ρ
                                                                                                                            (22) 
t t u t u u u ˆ 1 + = − ρ                                                                                                                               (23) 
t t v t v v v ˆ 1 + = − ρ                                                                                                                                (24) 
The exogenous variables are the non-core inflation (
nc
t π ), the change in wages ( t sal ∆ ) and 





t w d d + + = −1 1 0 π π                                                                                                                   (25) 
t t t sal e e sal χ + ∆ + = ∆ −1 1 0                                                                                                            (26) 
t t t y gto f f gto + ∆ + = ∆ −1 1 0                                                                                                           (27) 
                                                      
8   The distortion  1 t ω +  affects  t g  in a way that makes it relatively more persistent. However, since this 
distortion is Knightian in nature, it does not affect the autoregressive parameter of the cost-push process.      10
where   t w , t χ  and  t y  represent the error terms of the non-core inflation, change in wages and 
change in government spending specifications, respectively. They are assumed to follow an 
autoregressive AR(1) process: 
t t w t w w w ˆ 1 + = − ρ .                                                                                                                          (28) 
t t t χ χ ρ χ χ ˆ 1 + = −                                                                                                                            (29) 
t t y t y y y ˆ 1 + = − ρ
                                                                                                                             (30) 
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where   t δ , t ε  and  t η  represent the error terms of the US inflation, output gap and interest rate 
specifications, respectively,  and are defined as autoregressive AR(1) processes: 
t t t δ δ ρ δ δ ˆ
1 + = − .                                                                                                                            (34) 
t t t ε ε ρ ε ε ˆ 1 + = −                                                                                                                               (35) 
t t t η η ρ η η ˆ 1 + = −                                                                                                                              (36) 
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where the vector of predetermined state variables  1t x  is given by the following equation:
9 
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and the vector of non-predetermined state variables  2t x  has the components shown in the following 
equation: 
[ ] t t
c
t tcr x , , π = 2t x                                                                                                                            (39) 
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5. Selection of the Robust Control ‘Free’ Parameter 
The formulation of robust control used in this paper requires the value of the ‘free’ parameter, θ , to 
come from outside the model. The main purpose is to find reasonable values of the ‘free’ parameter 
to prevent the policy maker from appearing catastrophist instead of cautious. We follow Hansen and 
Sargent (2003) and use the detection error probability theory to choose reasonable values of θ. In 
particular, the objective is to find values of θ for which it is statistically difficult to distinguish 
between the reference and the distorted model. This way, extremely pessimistic cases are ruled out. 
The procedure consists of obtaining two types of probabilities: i) the probability of 
choosing the reference model when the data were generated by the distorted model and ii) the 
probability of choosing the distorted model when the data were generated by the reference model. 
The average of these two probabilities is the probability of making an error in the detection of the 
model – i.e. the detection error probability. Note that if there is no robustness () θ →∞  the 
reference and the distorted model are the same and the detection error probability is 0.5. On the 
other hand, when the level of robustness is infinite the detection error probability is zero. Hansen   12
and Sargent (2003) recommend the use of θ  associated with detection error probabilities between 
0.1 and 0.2 which correspond to confidence intervals of 95% and 90%, respectively. 
We use the code of Giordani and Soderlind (2004) to obtain the detection error 
probabilities. The detailed procedure is shown in Appendix B. We solved the problem for a time 
horizon of 150 months (T=150) and 1,000 simulations. Each simulation represents a random draw 
of the additive noise. We decided to use  325 θ = , which produces a detection error probability of 
0.2 when α  = 0.5, for a couple of reasons: i) it corresponds to a confidence interval of 90% and ii) 
produces important differences between the policy rules of the reference and distorted model. We 
find that in our model a detection error probability higher than 0.2 does not produce important 
differences between the policy rules.  
In order to observe the implied persistence of  325 θ = , we obtain the impulse-response 
functions of the output gap, core inflation and the nominal interest rate to a one-standard-deviation 
cost-push innovation. Figure 2 shows the impulse-response functions for regimes 1 and 2, assuming 
the absence of a Markov chain process between regimes.10 In regime 1, the impulse-response 
functions of the nominal interest rate, core inflation and output gap reveal a relatively more 
persistent cost-push process than in regime 2.  
                                                      
10   Only for the purpose of illustrating the differences between regimes 1 and 2, the initial state variables 
were set to zero.    13
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6. Caution versus recklessness losses  
The welfare analysis done in this paper is conditional on being in regime 2 and considers the 
possibility of switching to regime 1. The approach used in this work to deal with the Knightian 
uncertainty faced by the policy maker follows Zampolli (2006). First, we assume that the policy 
maker does not know the true transition probability q , but chooses a transition probability  ˆ q . 
Second, we fix the transition probability  p  or, equivalently, the expected duration of regime 1, 
which is  1
p
 periods. Finally, we obtain the losses associated with all the pairs  ˆ (,) qq. Losses are 
normalized with respect to  ˆ (,) qq = (0,0) and are conditional on being in regime 2. For every q, 
minimal losses occur when  ˆ . qq =  
In order to evaluate and characterize the optimal policy rule we define recklessness and 
caution losses. Recklessness losses are defined as the welfare losses that occur when the policy 
maker underestimates the probability of switching to regime 1, that is, when  ˆ . qq <  On the other 
hand, caution losses are the welfare losses that takes place when the policy maker overestimates the 
probability of switching to regime 1, that is, when  ˆ . qq >  Finally, recklessness and caution losses 
are defined as the sum of losses for which  ˆ qq <  and   ˆ qq > , respectively. The following table 
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Table 1. Recklessness and Caution Losses. 
LOSSES
α = 0.1 α = 0.5 α = 0.9
p = 0.25 55.01 55.08 55.44
CAUTION p = 0.5 55.01 55.08 55.72
p = 0.75 55.01 55.09 56.23
p = 0.25 55.27 56.83 65.00
RECKLESSNESS p = 0.5 55.27 56.85 69.29
p = 0.75 55.27 56.87 82.65  
 
Table 1 shows that recklessness losses are always higher than caution losses. This result 
argues in favor of caution over recklessness in the formulation of monetary policy when it is 
possible to transit to the regime with relatively more persistent cost-push shocks. Moreover, both 
types of losses are non decreasing with  p  and α . Since the losses are conditional on being in 
regime 2, higher values of  p  produce more frequent switches from regime 1 to regime 2. Finally, 
the difference between recklessness and caution losses increases with α .  
Figure 3 shows the losses for all  ˆ (,) qq pairs for different preference parameters and values 
of  p .
11 The transition probabilities chosen by the policy maker are on the y-axis and the true 
transition probabilities on the x-axis. First, it can be seen that all losses substantially increase when 
1.0 q =  regardless of  ˆ q . This occurs because regime 2, for all  1.0 q < , strongly prevails in the 
weighted matrix  2t R  given by Equation (A-24).  
 
                                                      
11   We decided to use the middle value of the range used by Favero and Milani (2005) for the interest rate 































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Losses associated with all the pairs  ˆ (,) qq conditional on being in regime 2 
Second, a horizontal comparison of the charts shows that losses increase with the preference 
parameter  α .
12 At first, this result seems counterintuitive. However, the detection error 
probabilities obtained for  325 θ =  decreased with α . In other words, the “evil” agent is able to do 
more damage when the policy maker increases the penalty on the only variable subject to the 
distortions.
13 Moreover, the charts show that recklessness losses substantially increase when the true 
                                                      
12
   It is worth mentioning that the scale of Charts 7-9 is different from the rest’s.  
13   Indeed, the system was no longer controllable for  1.0 α =  and some combinations of  ˆ (,, ) qqp.    17
transition probability  1.0 q = . On the other hand, caution losses do not substantially increase when 
the true transition probability  0.0 q = .       
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we develop a framework to obtain the optimal policy response in the presence of 
uncertainty about the persistence of cost-push shocks. We allow the economy to randomly alternate 
between two regimes that only differ in the degree of persistence of cost-push shocks. We model the 
possibility of sudden changes in such persistence by using robust control in one of the regimes of 
the Markov chain process. This combination of Markov regime-switching and robust control is 
applied to an open economy model for the Mexican economy. We obtain the welfare losses 
conditional on being in the regime with relatively less persistent shocks. In the evaluation of a 
monetary policy rule, we compare recklessness and caution losses. The former occurs when the 
monetary authority underestimates the probability of switching to the regime with relatively more 
persistent shocks. The latter occurs when the monetary authority overestimates such probability.  
To the authors’ knowledge, no previous study has combined Markov regime-switching and 
robust control. Conditional on being in the regime with relatively less persistence,  such 
combination delivers the following results: 1) underestimating the probability of switching to the 
regime with relatively more persistent cost-push shocks causes more welfare losses than its 
overestimation; and 2) the losses associated with the underestimation and overestimation of such 
probability increase with the penalty on inflation deviations from its target. These results argue in 
favor of caution over recklessness when it is possible to switch to the regime with relatively more 
persistent cost-push shocks. 
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Appendix A 
In this appendix we show the solution algorithm for the optimal policy under discretion with 
Markov regime-switching.   
12 nnn =+  where  1 n and  2 n   represent the number of predetermined and non-                        (A-1) 
  predetermined variables, respectively 
32,500 con =   con is the value taken by θ  in regime 2                  (A-2) 
325 = θ                                                                                                                                         (A-3) 
  . β 99585 0 =                                                                                                                                (A-4) 
) : ,1 :  A(1   A11 1 1 n n =                                                                                                                    (A-5) 
) : 1) ( , :  A(1   A12 n n n + = 1 1                                                                                                           (A-6) 
  ) : ,1 : 1)  A((   A21 1 1 n n n + =                                                                                                          (A-7) 
  ) : 1) ( , : 1)  A((   A22 n n n n + + = 1 1                                                                                                (A-8) 
) : ,1 : Q(1     Q11 1 1 n n =                                                                                                                    (A-9) 
) : 1) ( , : Q(1     Q12 n n n + = 1 1                                                                                                        (A-10) 
) : ,1 : 1) Q((     Q21 1 1 n n n + =                                                                                                         (A-11) 
) : 1) ( , : 1) Q((     Q22 n n n n + + = 1 1                                                                                               (A-12) 
:) , : B(1     B1 1 n =                                                                                                                           (A-13) 
[ ] =
*
11 1 BB  C                          ( A - 1 4 )  
:) , : 1 B(     B2 n n + = 1                                                                                                                     (A-15) 
:) , : U(1     U1 1 n =                                                                                                                          (A-16) 
:) , : 1 U(     U2 n n + = 1                                                                                                                    (A-17) 
 
The Bellman equation for the optimization can be written 
 
( )   ~ ~ ~ max min 1
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. 2 1 and 2 1 given        ,   ~ ~    . .
                        
1
* ,  j    , ,  i t s t = = + + = + + 1t 1 it jt 1t jt 1 1t x ε C u B x A x
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where the matrices with a tilde (~) are defined as 
 
  ) A - A (K   ) A K - (A     D 21 11 1t
-1
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                                              (A-21) 
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                                                   (A-24) 
1t 12 11 1t D  A    A   A + = ~                                                                                                                    (A-25) 
1t 12 1 1t G  A   B     B + = ~                                                                                                                      (A-26) 
1t 22 1t 21 1t 1t 12 11 1t D Q ' D     Q ' D     D Q   Q   Q + + + = ~                                                                           (A-27) 
2 1t 1 1t 22 1t 1t 12 1t U ' D     U     G Q ' D     G Q   U + + + = ~                                                                            (A-28) 
1t 1 2 1t 1t 22 1t 1t 1t G ' U     U G     G Q ' G     R   R + + + = ~                                                                            (A-29) 
2t 12 11 2t D  A    A   A + = ~                                                                                                                    (A-30) 
2t 12 1 2t G  A   B     B + = ~                                                                                                                      (A-31) 
2t 22 2t 21 2t 2t 12 11 2t D Q ' D     Q ' D     D Q   Q     Q + + + = ~                                                                          (A-32) 
2 2t 1 2t 22 2t 2t 12 2t U ' D     U     G Q ' D     G Q     U + + + = ~                                                                            (A-33) 
  G ' U     U ' G     G Q ' G     R     R 2t 1 2 2t 2t 22 2t 2t 2t + + + = ~                                                                        (A-34) 
 
The first order conditions of (A-18) with respect to 
*
it u  are 
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Combining with (A-18) gives 
 
1t it 2t x K x = , with   it it it it F G D K ~ − =  and                                                                               (A-38) 
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2t 2t 2t 2t 2t 2t 2t 1t 1t 1t 1t 1t 1t 1t
1t 1t 1t 1t 1t 1t 1t 1t 1t
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
p p β + − +
+ =
                  (A-39) 
 
() )) F B - A ( V )' F B - A ( ) F B - A ( V )' F B - A ((  
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Following Giordani and Söderlind (2004), the algorithm involves iterating until convergence 
(‘backwards in time’) on (A-19)-(A-40). It should be started with a symmetric positive definite 
1 it V +  and some  1 it K + . If  it F ~  and  it K  converge to constants  i F ~  and  i K , the dynamics of the 
model are 
  
1 t 1 1t i 1 1t ε C x M x + + + = , where  i
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Appendix B 
In this appendix we show the detailed procedure to obtain the detection error probability for our 
model. We follow the procedure shown in Hansen and Sargent (2003).  We start by defining the 
reference model as R and the distorted model as D. Model R is represented by the state-space 
representation given by the system equation (37) in the text whereas model D is the distorted 
model. The latter differs from the former because the cost-push process represented by equation 
(22) now has the additive distortion  1 t ω + . The additive noise is given by the vector  1 t ε + . The 
likelihood of a sample for model i given that the data is generated by model j is denoted by  ij L , 








≡                                 (B-1) 
The probability of making a mistake in the detection of a model given that the data was generated 
by model i is given by the following equation: 
Pr( | ) ( 0) ii p mistake i frec r == ≤                         (B-2) 
The probability of making a mistake in the detection of a model is the average of the probability of 




RD p pp θ =+                             (B-3) 
In order to find  () p θ we need to obtain  R p  and  D p . We first find  R p  using the following five 
steps: 
 
1. Generate a sample of  T = 150 observations for the state variable in the reference model R. That     
     is, we obtain the optimal trajectory for the state variables in the finite horizon model of  T   
     periods.  
2. We use Giordani and Soderlind (2004) specification that assumes the distribution of the additive  
     errors to be  () N 0,I . In other words the residuals have an identity variance-covariance matrix.        
     We obtain a random draw from this distribution for each simulation. 
3. The new residuals are  111 ttt ε εω +++ =+ (
                      (B-4)  
4. The  RD L  is calculated using the residuals of the R model minus the distortions:  111 ttt ε εω +++ =− (
.   
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     The distortions are generated using the feedback rule of  1 t ω + obtained from the D model. 
5. We obtain  R r  and  R p  for  a total of 1,000 simulations for a sample of T = 150. 
 
In order to obtain  D p  we follow a similar procedure as in steps 1 to 5. However, in the first step the 
150 observations of the state variable are generated using the distorted model D. In the second step 
the residuals of the distorted model is assumed to be  () N 0,I . In the fourth step  DR L  is obtained 
using  111 ttt ε εω +++ =+ (
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⎩⎭ ∑                   (B-6) 
The distortions are generated from the sample of the step 1. Once  DR L  is obtained we compute  D r  
and  D p  for the 1,000 simulations and T = 150.   23
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